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NOTES
CONFISCATION OF AUTOMOBILES FOR THE ILLEGAL TRANSPORTATION
OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS
There are two federal statutes under which automobiles may be
confiscated. One is the revenue statute' which provides that all
vehicles for the removal, deposit and concealment of goods upon
which there is a revenue tax with intent to defraud the government
of, such tax shall be confiscated. Under this statute the proceeding
is in rem and the interest of the innocent owner and lienholder
forfeited,2 with the one exception where the property has been put
to this use by a trespasser or thief.3 The other federal statute is
" U. S. Rev. Stat., sec. 3450, Compiled Stat., sec. 6352.
Goldsnith-Grant Co. v. U. S., 254 U. S. 505 (1921) ; Dobbins Distillery v.
U. S., 96 U. S. 395 (1877) ; U. S. v. One Ford Automobile (N. E. D. Tenn.
1924), 1 F. (2d) 654.
" U. S. v. One Ford Coupe (S. D. Idaho 1927), 21 F. (2d) 639; U. S. v. One
Buick Roadster (D. Mont. 1922), 280 F. 517.
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the prohibition statute4 which provides for the confiscation of all
vehicles used in the illegal transportation of intoxicating liquors.
Under the latter statute, only the wrongdoers interest is confiscated,
and the interest of the innocent owner and lienor is protected.5
The purpose of the revenue statute was to raise revenue for the
government. It is difficult to understand why this statute is enforce-
able in regard to liquor since the enactment of the prohibition statute
which was specially designed to enforce prohibition. There is an
irreconcilable conflict in the decisions of the federal courts on this
point. Some hold that the revenue statute is enforced so long as it
does not conflict with the prohibition statute.6 Others hold that the
statutes do not conflict, and the government has the election to pro-
ceed under either for the confiscation of automobiles seized with
liquor.7 Still others hold that the revenue statute does not apply,
and that all cases involving the transportation of liquor come under
the prohibition act.8 This appears to be the correct view for several
reasons-
1. It seems unreasonable that the court should extend the mean-
ing of the statute so as to impose a tax on goods which are forbidden
"National Prohibition Act, tit. 2, sec. 26 (Comp. Stat., sec. 10138Yamm).
5 U. S. v. One Cadillac Town Car (C. A. D. C. 1927), 18 F. (2d) 1005; U. S.
v. Sylvester (D. Conn. 1921), 273 F. 253.
VWillis-Campbell Act (Comp. Stat., sec. 10138 4/5 c) ; Payne v. U. S. (C. C.
A. 5th. 1922), 279 F. 112, held that the revenue act not repealed but is suspended
only where the facts of a particular case bring the matter under the Pro-
hibition Act Accord, U. S. v. One Haynes Automobile (C. C. A. 5th. 1921),
274 F. 926; McDowell v. U. S. (C. C. A. 9th. 1923) 286 F. 521.
"U. S. v. One Ford Coiupe, 272 U. S. 321 (1926), held that revenue statute
was not repealed by the Prohibition Act. The two statutes cover different
grounds and the government has the election to proceed under either.. Port
Gardner Investment Co. v. U. S., 272 U. S. 564 (1926), held that an arrest and
conviction under one statute is a bar to proceedings under the other. U. S. v.
One Essex (N. D. Ga. 1920), 266 F. 138; The Jugoslavia (E. D. La. 1927),
21 F. (2d) 99, where a boat loaded with liquor was found concealed in willows
on bank of Mississippi River, held no election for the Government but pro-
ceedings must be under the Revenue Statute; U. S. v. Commercial Credit Co.
(C. C. A. 4th, 1927), 20 F. (2d) 519; U. S. v. One Ford (D. Neb. 1927) 21 F.
(2d) 628.
'One Ford Touring Car v. U. S. (C. C. A. 8th. 1922), 284 F. 823, held that
the Revenue Statute was not applicable to the removal or concealment of liquor
manufactured since the enactment of the Prohibition Act; U S. v. One Bay
State Roadster (D. Conn. 1924), 2 F. (2d.) 616; U. S. v. One Chevrolet Auto-
mobile (M. D. Ala. 1927), 21 F. (2d.) 477, held that the Revenue Statute solely
intended as a revenue enforcement measure and cannot be used relative to con-
fiscation of vehicles used in unlawful transportation of liquor; U. S. v. One
Dodge Sedan (D. C. Utah, 1927), 21 F. (2d.) 971; U. S. v. One Buick Sedan
(S. D. Calif. 1924), 1 F. (2d.) 997, held that Revenue Statute not applicable
to mere illegal transportation of liquor.
NOTES
by the constitution of the United States. 9 There is no way possible
to pay this tax, and if there were, payment would subject the payer
to indictment for illegal possession.' 0
2. To prove an intent to defraud the government of this tax in
the case of a person who has been transporting would be difficult.
Clearly the sole intent is to evade the prohibition law. Proof of such
intent to defraud the government is necessary for confiscation under
the revenue statute."
The state statutes may be divided into two classes, those which
provide for the forfeiture of only the wrongdoer's interest in the
automobile, protecting the interest of the innocent owner;12 and
those which confiscate the car as a public nuisance and inimicable
to public welfare, depriving the innocent owner of his property
rights.13
The North Carolina statute14 provides for the confiscation of the
right, title, and interest of the defendant in the property used for
the illegal transportation of intoxicating liquors. This is a proceed-
ing in personam and the arrest and conviction of a wrongdoer is
required before the car can be confiscated. 15 The innocent owner
as well as lienor and mortgagee can reclaim the automobile. 16 It is
not necessary for the mortgagee that his mortgage be recorded for
the state does not occupy the position of a creditor. As between
mortgagors and mortgagees, the latter has the legal title even though
the mortgage has not been recorded.' 7
W. A. DEviN, JR.
IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN SALES OF GOODS
In a recent case it was held that in the sale of law books under
a trade name, "Encyclopedia of Evidence," there was an implied
'U. S. Const., Amend 18; Lewis v. U. S. (C. C. A. 6th. 1922), 280 F. 5, held
taxes on liquor no longer payable and hence there can be no intent to defraud
in not paying them; One Ford v. U. S. (C. C. A. 8th. 1922), 284 F. 823; U. S.
v. One Chevrolet (E. D. Mo. 1925), 9 F. (2d.) 85, held there is no tax, as
distinguished from a penalty, on manufacture of illicit liquor.
"0 U. S. v. Milstone (Ct. App. D. C. 1925), 6 F. (2d.) 481, held no tax can be
paid on moonshine liquor, for issuance of stamps forbidden.
U U. S. v. Two Mack Trucks (E. D. Pa. 1927), 20 F. (2d.) 188.
Colorado, Fla., Idaho, Me., Miss., Mont., N. C., Nebr., Okla., S. C., Utah,
W. Va.
"Van Oaten v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 465 (1926); FitzWilliam v. Common-
wealth, 154 N. E. 570 (Mass. 1927).1, C. S., sec. 3403.
"Skinner v. Thomas, 171 N. C. 98, 87 S. E. 976 (1916).
"State v. Johnson, 181 N. C. 638, 101 S. E. 433 (1921).
"'South Ga. Motor Co. v. Jackson, 184 N. C. 328, 114 S. E. 478 (1922).
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warranty that they were specifically as described and of good work-
manship according to the description. As to their fitness for the
purpose intended, it was held that there was no implied warranty that
they were suitable for the purpose of practicing law, though the
seller knew that such was the buyer's purpose when he purchased
the books.'
The important element is the buyer's reliance upon the seller's
judgment.2 If he buys a "known, described, and definite" article,
the contract is filled by delivery of the described article,3 though it
was intended for a special purpose.4 Where he orders by specifica-
tions, 5 by special name,6 by definite description, 7 or a special thing
of his own selection,8 the buyer relies on his own judgment; hence,
no warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is implied, though
the seller knew of the particular purpose.9
Recent cases say that when the article is "well known and defined
in current trade,"'1  "selected by the buyer,"" "specific and desig-
nated,"' 2 or "known and described,"13 the sale of the article even
1L. D. Powell v. Cowart, 139 S. E. 585 (Ga. 1927) ; Supported on both
points by F. & L. Mfg. Co. v. Kitteredge & Co., 242 Ill. 88, 89 N. E. 723
(1909). Implied warranties rest logically on one of two bases:
(1) A buyer without opportunity to examine should be protected [unless
opportunity for inspection, caveat emptor does not apply-Hood v. Bloch Bros.,
29 W. Va. 244] against those things which an examination would reveal [W. R.
Colchord Machine Co. v. Loy-Wilson Foundry and Machine Co., 131 Mo. App
540, 110 S. W. 630 (1908)], but not when he relies upon his own judgment;
[Hunter v. Waterloo Gasoline Engine Co., 237 S. W. 819 (1922) ] ;
(2) A buyer naturally relying on the representation or superior knowledge
or skill of a seller should be protected to the extent of this natural reliance
[International Harvester Co. v. Porter, 160 Ky. 509, 169 S. W. 993 (1914)].
Implied warranties are exceptions to the general rule, caveat emptor.
'Farrell v. Manhatten Market Co., 198 Mass. 271, 84 N. E. 481 (1908);
Hunter v. Waterloo Engine Co., 237 S. W. 819 (1922).
'Ideal Heating Co. v. Kramer, 127 Iowa, 137, 102 N. W. 840 (1905).
'1 Parsons, Contracts, 587.
'Gill & Co. v. Nat. Gaslight Co., 172 Mich. 295, 137 N. W. 690 (1912);
Motor Works v. Vollars, 83 Was. 680, 145 p. 997 (1915).
8 City of Savannah v. U. S. Fuel Corp., 116 S. E. 28 (Ga. 1922).
"Century Electric Co. v. Detroit Copper Co., 264 F. 49 (1920) ; Bowker
Fertilizer Co. v. Wallingford, 111 Atl. 329 (Me. 1920). Also, this case is to the
effect that mere knowledge of the particular purpose by the seller is not
enough to bind him to a warranty of fitness.
"Port Carbon Iron Co. v. Groves, 68 Pa. (18 P. F. Smith) 149 (1871);
McDonald v. Acme Lumber Co., 216 Mich. 601, 185 N. W. 665 (1922).
'Davis Calyx Drill Co. v. Mallory, 137 F. 332, 69 C. C. A. 662 (1905). Ad-
ditional citations: See 17 Dec. Dig. Sales, section 273 (5).
" U. S. Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Ellis, 201 P. 900 (Wash. 1921);
Ill. Zinc Co. v. Senmple, 123 Kan. 368, 255 p. 78 (1927).'Hunter v. Gasoline Engine Co., supra, n. 2.
' 2Am. Soda Fountain Co. v. Palace Drug Store, 245 S. W. 1032 (Tex. 1922).
"Clark Lumber Co. v. Kelly, 117 Kan. 285, 231 p. 71 (1925).
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with knowledge of the use intended carries no implied warranty,
since the express qualification of quality and characteristics shows
the buyer's reliance upon his own judgment. The point has not been
passed upon in North Carolina.' 4
Under the Uniform Sales Act,15 too, the buyer's justifiable re-
liance on the seller's skill and judgment is alone important. 16 This
is a question of fact in each case, and proof of inspection is, at least,
evidence against an implied warranty. 17 When goods are sold under
a trade name, there is no implied warranty that they are suitable for
the purpose intended,' 8 for then a specific article is bought, and
whether under a trade name or not,19 this warranty does not arise.
Where the particular purpose is coextensive with the general
purpose of an article, there is an implied warranty of fitness for the
purpose,20 by reason of the fact that a lack of fitness for its general
"'Swift & Co. v. Etheredge, 190 N. C. 162, 129 S. E. 453 (1926). Where the
seller knows the purpose intended, if the very article contracted for is received,
the buyer can not complain of its worthlessness,--even if use alone will reveal
the inferior quality. Threshing Mach. Co. v. McClamroch, 152 N. C. 405, 67
S. E. 991 (1910). Where fertilizer was sold under name and analysis (printed
on the sack as required by statute), there was an implied warranty that it was
merchantable and fit for use as the name represented it to be. Swift & Co. v.
Aydlett, 192 N. C. 330, 153 S. E. 141 (1926).
The Uniform Sales Act, which has been adopted by practically all of the
leading commercial states, copies the English Sales of Goods Act, which in turn
merely codified the English common law. Since the common law held that
where "a known, described or definite article" was purchased, there was no
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, the presumption is that
sect. 15 (4) (below) does not change the law on this point simply by using
"patent or trade name" instead. Sales Act, Section 15: There is no implied
warranty or condition as to quality or fitness for any particular purpose, except
as follows:
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller
the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the
buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment, there is an implied warranty that
the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.
(4) In case of a contract to sell or a sale of a specified article under its
patent or trade name, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any par-
ticular purpose.
Both of these subsections are found in the English Sales of Goods Act,
Section 14.
" Brought v. Redewell Music Co., 17 Ariz. 393, 153 P. 285 (1915).
"Williston, Sales, Vol. 1, Section 325.
"Montgomery Foundry & Fittings Co. v. Hall Planetary Thread Milling
Mach. Co., 282 Pa. 212, 127 Ad. 633 (1925).
'Sampson v. Frank F. Pels Co., 192 N. Y. S. 538 (1922), interpreting Per-
sonal Property Laws (Sales of Goods Act) Section 96, subd. 1.
" Flour must make bread, Kaull v. Blacker, 107 Kan. 578, 193 P. 182
(1920). An automobile must be capable of use as a vehicle, Harvey v. Buick
Motor Co., 177 S. W. 774 (Mo. App. 1915). A potato digger must dig pota-
toes, Hallock v. Cutter, 71 Ill. App. 471.
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
purpose would make it unmerchantable and unsalable. However,
there are a number of cases holding that fitness for a particular pur-
pose may be impliedly warranted, where the particular purpose is nar-
rower than the general purpose ;21 these cases, also, turn upon the
justifiable reliance upon the seller. Yet, if the purchase is by trade
name, even though the particular purpose is known to the seller, gen-
erally there is no implied warranty as to the particular purpose.
22
With regard to the warranty of description and good workman-
ship the case also represents the apparent weight of authority, even
under the Sales Act.23 Goods must be of the specified kind and
quality,2 4 must answer the specific description and be of merchantable
quality.25  The article must conform to the description in kind,20
as made by the seller,27 under an implied warranty to this effect.2 9
The case is even stronger, if there is no inspection.29 In North
Carolina goods sold by name carry an implied warranty that they
are merchantable, and salable, under that name, whether the defect
is hidden or discoverable.30
D. S. GARDNER.
INHERITANCE TAXATION-TRANSFERS IN CONTEMPLATION OF
DEATH AND TRANSFERS WHOSE POSSESSION AND ENJOY-
MENT DO NOT TAKE EFFECT UNTIL AFTER DEATH
In order to prevent evasions of the inheritance tax laws the fed-
eral government and many of the states have passed laws taxing
transfers of property inter vivos.1 The general theory behind these
'Glass Co. v. Pot Co., 97 Md. 429, 55 At. 447 (1903); Heating Co. v.
Kramer, 127 Iowa 137, 102 N. W. 840 (1905).
'Storage Co. v. Woods & Zent, 99 Mich. 269, 58 N. W. 320 (1894);
Ehrsam v. Brown, 76 Kan. 206, 91 P. 179 (1907); Grand Ave. Hotel Co. v.
Wharton, 79 Fed. 43, 24 C. C. A. 441 (1897) ; Queinahoning Coal Co. v. Sani-
tary etc. Co., 88 N. J. L. 174, 95 At!. 986 (1915) ; Boston Consol. Gas Co. v.
Folson, 237 Mass. 565, 130 N. E. 197 (1921). Contra: Blackmore v. Fair-
banks, 79 Iowa 282, 44 N. W. 548 (1890); Kansas City Bolt Co. v. Rodd, 220
Fed. 750, 136 C. C. A. 356 (1915).
' Sales Act, sec. 15, subd. 2: where goods are bought from the description
of the seller there is an implied warranty of merchantable quality.
I Norman Lumber Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 100 W. Va. 515, 131 S. E. 12(1926).(1El Paso & S. W. E. Co. v. eichel & Weichel, 130 S. W. 922 (Tex. 1910).
'Baer & Co. v. Cooperage & Box Mfg. Co., 159 Ala. 491, 49 So. 92 (1909).
z I. H. Stone Corp. v. Princeton Ice & Storage Co., 212 Ky. 404, 279 S. W.
226 (1926).
"Rauth v. Southwest Warehouse Co., 158 Cal. 54, 109 P. 839 (1910).
' Wilson v. Wiggin, 73 W. Va. 560, 81 S. E. 842 (1914).
'Lexington Gro. Co. v. Vernay, 167 N. C. 427, 83 S. E. 567 (1914).
137 Cyc. 1567; 1926 Revenue Act.
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statutes is that the transfers which they tax are either in contem-
plation of death, 2 or are made so that the possession and enjoyment
of the property do not pass until after death,3 and so are testamentary
in their nature.
4
1. Transfers in contemplation of death.5 In determining what
transfers are in contemplation of death it is necessary to consider the
following: the motive behind the transfer, the age of the transferor,
his mental and physical condition and the proportion of the estate
transferred.
6
Whether a transfer is in contemplation of death is generally con-
sidered to be a question of fact to be determined by all the circum-
stances of the individual case.7 The federal courts seem to follow
the same rule as the state courts, pointing out that the expectation
of death need not be an expectation of immediate death, nor on the
other hand is it that expectation of death which every man has that
death will ensue in the future.8 Apparently the expectation of death
meant by the statute is about the same as the motive which leads a
man to draw his will disposing of his property after his death.9
2. Transfers the possession and enjoyment of which do.not pass
until after death. The inheritance tax laws have lead to the invention
of a great many subtle devices attempting to evade them. On the
whole the courts seem to have taken a rather rational view of such
devices and do not hesitate to go back of the form of the transfer
40 A. L. R. 864.
7 A. L. R. 1028; 21 A. L. R. 1335; 41 A. L. R. 998; 43 A. L. R. 1229.
4 Re Reynolds 169 Cal. 600, 147 Pac. 268 (1915); Re Minor, 180 Pac. 813
(Calif., 1919); Cole v. Nickle, 177 Pac. 409 (Nev., 1919).
'People v. Dank, 289 Ill. 542, 546, 124 N. E. 625 (1919).
'Rea v. Heiner, 6 Fed. (2nd.) 321 (1927) Transfer made by woman 76
years old in good health, for purpose of bringing daughter home, not made in
contemplation of death; Tipps v. Bass, 21 Fed. (2nd.) 460 (1927) Transfer of
estate by woman of 68, in good health, to escape management of the estate not
in contemplation of death; Smart et al v. U. S. 21 Fed. (2nd.) 188 (1927).
Transfer of real estate, by woman of 84, to shift burden of making extensive
repairs, not in contemplation of death; In re Pauson, 86 Cal. 358, 199 Pac. 331
(1924). Transfer of large estate by man of 78 to a corporation whose stock
was given to his sons, held to be a transfer in contemplation of death; Schwab
v. Doyle, 269 Fed. 321 (1920). Transfer of large portion of estate by woman
of 77, who suffered from serious physical disorders, held to be in contemplation
of death; State v. Stevens, 188 N. W. 484 (Wis. 1921). The amount of the
gift compared to the size of the estate is a material factor in determining the
nature of the transfer; Gaither v. Miles, 268 Fed. 692 (1920). Gift of insurance
policy amounting to 4% of the estate not large enough to put burden of showing
transfer was not in contemplation of death on the plaintiff.
149 A. L. R. 864.
" Tipps v. Bass, Rea v. Heiner, Smart v. U. S., all note 6 supra.
17 A. L. R. 1229.
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to get at its substance. Courts can and will go outside of the instru-
ment itself to get at'the motive of the grantor and it has been held
in many jurisdictions that a transfer is taxable even though the mo-
tive of contemplation of death does not appear on the face of the
instrument itself.10
Power of revocation. There are two views on the effect of a
power of revocation on the taxability of the transfer. Some courts
hold that the mere reservation of a, power of revocation by the
grantor will not stamp the transfer as being one the possession and
use of which is to take effect after death.11 Others hold that the
gift cannot be absolute and, revocable at the same time, and so a
revocable gift is taxable.' 2 The first view seems to be the most
logical, for it is true that a power of revocation is not tantamount to
a property right, and if the grantor dies without having exercised
the power nothing remains to be done to complete the transfer. But
it is submitted that the second view is the better from a practical
standpoint. For example, the man who puts his large estate in trust
for his heirs but reserves a power of revocation really retains con-
trol of the property. His wishes will be obeyed so long as he has
the power to revoke the gift. The second rule gets behind the form
of the transfer and taxes the property on the death of the grantor.
"Kelly v. Woolsey, 177 Cal. 325, 170 Pac. 837 (1918). In determining
whether property is subject to tax, the inquiry is not confined to the terms of
the written instrument; parol evidence of real agreement is admissible; People
v. Shutts, 305 Ill. 539, 137 N. E. 418 (1922). Conveyance in escrow subject to
inheritance tax; Farkas v. Smith, 147 Ga. 503, 94 S. E. 1016 (1918). Devise to
a trustee who was to distribute the estate was within the meaning of the
statute; Harber v. Welchell, 156 Ga. 601, 119 S. E. 695 (1923); State & City
Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 188 N. C. 762, 125 S. E. 621 (1924).
1People v. Northern Trust Co., 289 Ill. 475, 124 N. E. 662 (1919). "No
deed is testamentary in character, or is to be held to take effect after death, by
reason alone of the clause of revocation"; State Street Trust Co. v. Stevens,
209 Mass. 373, 95 N. E. 851 (1911). "Test of whether transfer exempt from
inheritance tax does not depend on whether power to revoke was reserved":
In re Millers Estate, 236 N. Y. 290, 140 N. E. 701 (1923). Reservation of
power to revoke by grantor of trust deeds held not to make transfer taxable.
State and City Bank & Trust Co., note 10 supra. Power to revoke, alter,
or otherwise modify or terminate; the right to control action of trustees and
vote stock, prevents the gift from being absolute and is taxable; In re Danna
Co., 164 App. Div. 45, 149 N. Y. Sup. 451 (1914). "Where donor transferred
one half interest in stock to donee, reserving income and power to revoke, the
transfer was taxable"; Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 15 Fed. (2nd.)
706 (1926). "Trusts under instrument retaining in founder complete power
of disposition, not taking effect till his death, subject to tax"; In re Fulham,
96 Vt. 308, 119 Atl. 433 (1923). "Property transferred in trust, but subject
to recall during life of donor, held liable to transfer tax"; Dubois's Appeal,
121 Pa. 268, 15 Atl. 641 (1888). A conveyance enabling donor to incur liabilities
to full value of estate, "is made and intended to take effect after death of
grantor."
